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Good Governance, Transparency and Regulatory
Issues in Financial Sector Development and Stability
Professor Bolaji Owasanoye*
I.

Introduction

G

ood governance and transparency are words of common usage in
present times. Good governance connotes many things, but is anchored
on the desire of the state to develop. ―Development‖ as a concept is also
fraught with a vagary of divergent factors that are not easily subjected to
measurement. It has been said that it is easier to speak of rich and poor countries
than to speak of developed or not developed economies because the indicators
of wealth, which reflect the quantity of resources available to a society, provide
no information about the allocation of those resources1. As a result, citizens of
countries having similar incomes may not enjoy similar quality of life.2
United Nations documents emphasize that ―human development is best ‖
measured by life expectancy, adult literacy, access to all three levels of
education, as well as people‘s average income, which is a necessary condition
of their freedom of choice. Therefore, the notion of development incorporates all
aspects of individuals‘ well-being, from health status to economic and political
freedom3. ―Human development being the end, good governance and
economic growth will be the means.‖4
Development can also be seen in both physical and psychological realities. The
physical reality of development is found in the existence or availability of real and
tangible structures of development or infrastructure like schools, hospitals, roads,

* Professor Owasanoye is the Director of Research, Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies,
Executive Director, Human Development Initiatives (not for profit); Professorial Research Associate,
School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, Africa Representative, Section on Criminal
Law, International Bar Association, Senior Special Fellow, United Nations Institute for Training and
Research.
1 ―What is Development?‖ www.worldbank.org/depweb
2 see generally Bolaji Owasanoye ―Rule of Law and National Development‖ in Rule of Law and Good
Governance, Azinge and Owasanoye ed. Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, 2009 pp. 304324.
3 See generally UN Human Development Reports http://undp.org
4 Ibid UNHDR 1996.
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bridges, factories, etc. while the psychological reality is considered essential for
the enjoyment of the benefits of physical development5.
Good governance as a concept is generally recognized to have basic features viz.
poverty alleviation; security of life and property; maintenance of law and order and
an acceptable level of infrastructural development. In the context of financial
sector regulation, it implies that the focus and objectives of the regulator should be
how to regulate to guarantee poverty alleviation; improve the security of life and
property; enhance maintenance of law and order and sustain an acceptable level
of infrastructural development that would foster economic growth.

I.1

Financial Services Sector

The financial services sector of any economy is the channel through which
financial resources mainly capital are transmitted to the economy. The key
functions of the sector may be summarised as; mobilization of savings from
different parts of the economy; allocation of capital to needy sectors based on
scale of return; monitoring the use of investments either by government,
corporations or individuals; and assessment and management of financial risks for
investors.
Given the importance of these functions to the economic health of a nation,
regulation of financial services sector is taken seriously and is the function of
different agencies led by the Central Bank. The powers given central banks by
law, underscore the importance of law in financial sector regulation in order to
ensure the fulfilment of the objectives of the financial sector and guarantee
stability and growth. In this regard, central bank regulatory powers are constantly
reviewed to enable it superintend financial sector stability in response to modern
trends and international best practices. For example, the powers of Central Bank
of Nigeria (CBN) to regulate the financial services sector was enhanced by the
passage of the Central Bank Act of 2007 6.

I.2

Regulation and Development

Regulation as a concept in economic management is founded on the ideology of
development as a key objective of governance. As was noted by White7 Amartya Sen (1999). Development as Freedom. (Alfred Knopf: New York) p. 75
Before 2007 the CBN Act was revised in 1991 33 years after the enabling act was first passed.
7 Developmental States and Socialist Industrialization in the Third World' Journal of Development Studies,
21, 1 Oct. 1984.
5
6
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"The modern notion of `development economics' rests on a more or less
explicit concept of the state as a crucial stimulant and organizer of socioeconomic progress. This intellectual paradigm has drawn historical
sustenance from the argument that the developmental process is less
'spontaneous' more subject to teleological determination, with the state as
the major agent of social transformation in both capitalist and socialist
contexts...”
In other words, we cannot separate state intervention by regulation as a necessary
factor in the objective of development or good governance. The limit of state
intervention is, thus, defined by the statutory power to regulate. The power of the
CBN to regulate the financial services sector is found in the CBN Act 8 and the
Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act 9. Specifically, section 2(a) of the CBN
Act gives it power to promote monetary stability in Nigeria. This it does by issuing
monetary policy circulars from time to time. These policy circulars are obligatory
on players in the sector and are regarded as subsidiary instruments having the
force of law.10
This position is affirmed by sections 56 and 59(2) (a) of Banks and Other Financial
Institutions Decree No. 25 of 1991, which gives the Governor of the Central Bank
power to make regulations to control institutions under his jurisdiction generally
and mandates every bank to comply with the Monetary Policy Guidelines and
other directives as the Bank may, from time to time specify, respectively.

II.

Transparency and Accountability

Transparency and accountability are expressions of common usage in Nigeria
although they are vanishing ideals. Every institution of government appears to
idolise the concepts, but the more they are highlighted, the more elusive they
appear to be in practical terms and implementation. The recent global financial
crisis revealed the underbelly or absence of transparency and accountability in
Nigeria‘s financial services sector.
The global financial crisis underscores the importance of regulation but also its
limitations. There is no doubt that the financial crisis was accentuated by the

No. 63 of 2007
Decree No. 25 of 1991, now Cap. B3 LFN 2004
10 See section 12(1) Interpretation Act cap 192 LFN 1990
8
9
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absence of transparency and accountability and the failure of the rule of law
wherein regulators failed to use law to minimise the impact of the crises on the
local economy. The crisis also revealed the underbelly of legal regulation,
indicating that many aspects of finance, financial policy and financial law and
regulation need rethinking at international, regional and domestic levels. We
must, however, not lose sight of the fact that the reaction of the regulatory
authorities to the crisis was situated within the statutory powers. Such powers were
invoked to address the crises as soon as the regulator found the political will to
act. In other words, on the one hand, the crises escalated because the law was
not followed, while on the other hand, the ultimate power to address the crises
was found within the law as soon as the regulator found the courage to act.

III.

Rule of Law in Financial Sector Regulation

The rule of law is a mix of technical or procedural components, as well as
substantive moral content that encompass a system where institutions and
officials are guided and constrained by the law, i.e., government that is
accountable to, not above, the law; a body of laws that are transparent,
reasonably predictable, validly derived, and fairly and equitably applied; laws,
principles and procedures that protect those civil, political, and economic rights
that have become enshrined as universal human rights; and a fair and effective
legal system led by an independent and professionally competent judiciary that
acts as the final arbiter of the law. The term "rule of law" also relates to the
process rather than substance and refers to law made by legitimate authority,
certain, clear, publicly accessible, consistent, prospective, and commanding
obedience.
One of the challenges faced by rule of law in Nigeria is that its principles are
hardly observed. Access to legislation and regulatory guidelines or subsidiary
instruments both substantive and subsidiary is a major challenge 11. For example,
the CBN monetary policy circulars have the force of law as subsidiary instruments
made pursuant to its powers under section 51 of the CBN Act but the policies are
not readily accessible by the public either in printed format or on CBN website.
For effective financial sector regulation, it is not only financial services providers
who ought to be notified of the CBN circulars, members of the public for whom
Different versions of laws already passed and in the process of being passed are often in circulation
to the consternation of the end user. Recently, the Senate raised alarm at the prevalence of differing
versions of law on sale on street corners. It is said that eight or more versions of the Petroleum Industry
Bill exist in Nigeria
11
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such regulations are made ought to have easy access to such circulars. This will
also assist transparency as we will discuss later. There is also the challenge of
blatant disobedience to laws and the inability or lack of will power on the part of
regulator and law enforcers to command obedience and punish offenders.
In the context of financial services, absence of rule of law means that uncertainty
will reign in the economy. Without transparent legal rules, the cost of doing
business rises with further consequences leading to increased cost of raising
capital, higher risk premiums, and lack of fidelity amongst players. Debtors will not
repay debts because they know that laws and contract obligations are not
consistently enforced. In such a set-up, corruption thrives and spreads like a virus.
Therefore, the rule of law provides an essential framework for economic activity.

IV.

Some Regulatory Powers of CBN Relative to a Developing Economy

Given the wide powers of CBN in its enabling statutes it is not possible to discuss
in-depth all its regulatory powers in a short paper of this nature, therefore, we will
focus on the following viz. payment system regulation, external reserves
management, power of supervision and micro credit policy framework.
IV.1
Payments System
Payments system is important for the proper functioning of financial markets and
the economy. There is a linkage between an effective payment system and the
economy as a whole. Thus, problems affecting the payments system affect the
entire financial system and the economy as a whole. Section 47 of the Central
Bank of Nigeria Act 2007 provides for the Bank to facilitate the efficient clearing
of cheques and credit instruments and to establish clearing houses for the
purpose.
The exchange of payment related information between system participants and
any regulations under which payments are settled on a bilateral or multilateral
basis is known as clearing. Settlement implies the actual discharge of an
obligation, i.e. by debiting the specific amount from the payer‘s account, and
crediting the payee‘s account, while the infrastructure, which facilitates the
clearing and settlement of financial instruments is known as the payment
system.12 Efficient payments system provides the basis for the Central Bank‘s
O. J. Nnanna and M. Ajayi : The Role of Payments System in Liquidity Management: Central Bank in
Perspective. CBN BULLION Vol 29 No 1 Jan -March 2005 p.34
12
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liquidity forecasting and management process, the features of which affect the
demand and supply of bank reserves, credit delivery and support for economic
growth.
The modernisation of the process for handling payments started with the
Magnetic Ink Character Recognition (MICR) programme of the CBN, which
involved the phased adoption of MICR technology for processing of inter- bank
transfer and in- house cheques. This was followed by the establishment of
Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) for cash dispensing, account balance enquiry
and payment of utility cheques. The ATM in turn provided links to online customers
and other account systems among bank branch network to facilitate payment
services. Currently, CBN has introduced cash-less economy policy, effective April
2012 starting with a pilot in Lagos State. The policy is aimed at reducing the cost
of handling cash, enhance security and diminishing the opportunities for money
laundering, amongst others13.
Settlements through inter-branch transfers are currently undertaken almost
instantaneously. Cheque clearing cycle is T+3 for local and up country. Even
then the time can be shortened as the market keeps evolving with the
introduction of modern facilities.
The link between the payments system and liquidity management is reflected in
the interface between liquidity and payment channels. 14 A major payment
system failure would bring countless commercial transactions to an abrupt halt,
impede the operation of business in virtually all parts of the economy and
fundamentally undermine investor and business confidence. This is a major
concern with regard to the introduction of the cashless economy because the
infrastructure to back up the effective and efficient implementation of the policy
is not yet in place while the public education component is inadequate in the
light of the fact that the Nigerian economy, which is dominated by the informal
sector, is largely run on cash-and-carry basis. Vulnerability to fraud is also a major
concern as expressed by the security experts.15

see generally http://www.cbn.gov.ng/cashless/ accessed, 22nd April 2012
Ibid p.38
15 Nation Newspaper 20th April 2012
13
14
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IV.2
External Reserves Management
External Reserves are external assets of a country that are readily available to
and managed by the CBs for direct financing of government‘s expenditure,
intervention in foreign exchange markets and meeting other external financing
commitments. By section 24 of the CBN Act, the Bank is required to maintain at all
times a reserve of external assets consisting of all or any of the assets specified in
the section.
Section 25 provides that the Bank shall use its best endeavours to maintain
external reserves at levels considered by the Bank to be appropriate for the
country and the monetary system of Nigeria. According to Nnadi, a distinction
should be made between a country‘s external assets and its external reserves. A
country‘s external assets comprise the foreign exchange holdings of the
government, semi-official institutions, commercial and merchant banks and that
of the Central Bank of that country while the Central Bank‘s component of the
external assets may be interpreted as its reserves 16. The reserve management
strategy of the CBN is anchored on liquidity management, adequate returns and
capital preservation. In this case, the Bank holds the larger proportion of its
reserves in secure, liquid though low yield assets such as government bonds and
time deposits with reputable international financial institutions. 17

Sections 2 and 24(h) of CBN Act and Good Governance18
Section 2: Delegation of Management of Foreign Reserves
One of the much-touted reasons for the bank consolidation policy embarked
upon in 2005 was the possibility of delegating the management of the nation‘s
external reserves to the newly consolidated and stronger deposit money banks. In
anticipation of this, many of them established partnerships with foreign banks.
Although section 2(c) of the Act placed responsibility for management of
reserves on the CBN, it was speculated that the CBN planned to delegate this
function. Delegating this duty would be in breach of one of the CBN‘s main
functions. If the law wished CBN to delegate the management of reserves it
would have so expressed as done under s.36(3) which empowers it to delegate

Ben C. Nnadi: ―International Reserve Management: A Synopsis‖ CBN Bullion VOL. 27 No 1 2002 p. 39
Sheriffdeen A. Tella: Overview of External Reserves Management in Nigeria CBN Bullion Vol. 31 No.2
April-June 2007. P1 at p.8
18 See generally H.K. Fujah CBN Act 2007 A Review pub. HK. Fujah, 2009.
16
17
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the power of collecting and paying government money in places where it has no
branch.
Section 24(h) says - The Bank shall at all times maintain a reserve of external
assets consisting of all or any of the following:
(h) Investment by way of loan or debenture in an investment bank or
development financial institutions within or outside Nigeria for a maximum period
of five years in so far as:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)

the amount invested is no more than 5% of the total foreign reserves;
the reserve level at the time of investment is more than such amount
as will sustain twenty four months of import; and,
the loan or debenture is denominated in foreign currency.

The section empowers CBN to lend part of Nigeria‘s foreign reserves to private
local and international entities ostensibly to enhance national revenue since the
assets will earn interest. The provision seems to have been influenced by the
positive health of the nation‘s reserves at the time of the passage of the 2007 Act.
The rationale was that such healthy savings ought not to be left idle in the
accounts. The ambiguous provision prescribes 5per cent but does not say if this is
limited to one or all banks? Can CBN lend 5 per cent of foreign reserves at any
point in time to each and every applicant? The answer would, in practical terms,
seem to be in the negative but that does not cure the ambiguity. According to
Fujah (2009), the provisions do not address some key issues.19
(a)

It assumes that the nation may never need to make provision for more than
24 months imports or that the economy is unlikely to expand to such level;

(b)

It suggests that national funds could be more secure with private entities
than with public. Recent developments had, however, showed that private
banks both local and international can become distress and can be wound
up. Government cannot be wound up, though they may, like companies,
face economic hardship. The confidence reposed in private entities to
invest national reserves is misplaced and unduly optimistic. Nigeria‘s private

19

Ibid.
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sector has not performed up to expectation in many respects nor exhibited
a higher standard of probity than the public sector;
(c)

Lending will be unsecured with all the attendant risks that are associated
with it. In the absence of security, what is the consideration that would be
offered by the borrowers of public funds given that the CBN frowns at local
banks for unsecured lending that exposes them to undue risks and threatens
shareholders‘ and depositors‘ funds? How does the CBN hope to prevent
risk to national funds. Besides, the suggestion of the provision negates the
safety inherent in the policy that CBN cannot lend to public bodies without
government guarantee. Note that section 29(e) and (g) of the Act requires
CBN to lend local currency to public and private bodies only upon provision
of collateral e.g. Treasury bills.

(d)

The provision benchmarks the amount lendable against the country‘s stock
of reserves i.e. the more we save the more you can lend out. This negates
the practice of lending against the borrower‘s capacity and not the
lender‘s capacity. Indeed s.38 of the same Act enjoins CBN to lend to the
Federal Government of Nigeria only against the FGN‘s actual revenue not
against the money in the CBN‘s vaults.

(e)

The period for which money can be lent out is also questionable. Five years
unsecured lending of national assets to private banks cannot be said to be
prudent especially in the light of s.38 mentioned above which allows the
CBN to lend local currency to Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) for one
year only. Why allow CBN to lend foreign currency unsecured for five years
to private institutions?

(f)

Will the CBN make provision for such loans in its books and accounts as it
mandates banks to do? Will the CBN humbly anticipate the failure of some
of the loans and provide for them? If yes, how much of the loan it grants will
it provide for without making its books and the economy look negative in
presentation and projections.

Section 24(h) makes the CBN attractive to banks that it is supposed to regulate.
Though regarded as lender of last resort, with the possibility of generous
unsecured money available for five years, CBN may become the first and last
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port of call for banks looking for cheap and free foreign currency. The question of
whether the CBN will be morally upright in its dealings with those to whom it has
lent money remains unclear? It may, thus, be asked, is this good governance?
If, as has recently happened, the local banks that borrow under this provision
become insolvent for any reason, the CBN is required to bail them out with naira
as lender of last resort. In this regard, public funds suffer double jeopardy in the
hands of unscrupulous local banks.
In the light of the explanations by the CBN to states calling for the disbursement of
savings in foreign reserves that they have already shared the naira equivalent
through the approved revenue allocation formula, therefore, technically
speaking, the money no longer belongs to states or FGN, would it not amount to
releasing the same money into the economy twice if same were to find its way
back through loans to private banks? Could this induce inflation? How much
control would the CBN place on dollar loans to local banks. Is there any possibility
that such money could be round trip by local banks to the foreign exchange
market.
The 2007 re-enactment of the CBN Act seems to suggest that the CBN suddenly
developed a commercial approach to managing public assets by seeking to
invest foreign reserves in a manner that jeopardises the economy.

V.

Supervision

Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act (BOFIA) empowers the CBN to conduct
special examination. In order to properly appreciate the extent of these powers
especially in the light of recent actions taken by the CBN against weak banks
and the challenge of those actions, we will set out extensively the powers of CBN
on supervision of banks. Section 33 of the BOFIA provides:
(1)
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

The Governor shall have power to order a special examination or
investigation of the books and affairs of a bank where he is satisfied thatit is in the public interest so to do; or
the bank has been carrying on its business in a manner detrimental to the
interest of its depositors and creditors; or
the bank has "insufficient" assets to cover its liabilities to the public; or
the bank has been contravening the provisions of this Act; or
an application is made thereof by-
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a director or shareholder of the bank; or
a depositor or creditor of the bank:

This provision is strengthened by section 35 of the BOFIA, which gives similar wide
powers over a failing bank including power to prohibit a failing bank from
extending any further credit facility for a stated period; remove, for reasons to be
given in writing, any manager, director or officer of the bank, notwithstanding
anything in any written law, or any limitations contained in the memorandum and
articles of association of the bank; appoint any person as director of the bank
and order that the person so appointed be paid by the bank such remuneration
as may be set out in the order; appoint any person to advise the bank in relation
to the proper conduct of its business, and provide, in order for the person so
appointed to be paid by the bank, such remuneration as may be set out in the
order. If the steps enumerated above have been taken and the affected bank
does not improve, the CBN might, under section 36 and 37 of the BOFIA hand
over the failing bank to the Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC) being
the undertaker, to see to the painful euthanasia or otherwise of the bank.
These wide powers empower the CBN to maintain financial stability and
consequently manage the economy and were recently used to sack the CEOs of
eight banks and liquidated three banks. Furthermore, protection of depositors
helps to prevent widespread panic withdrawal and damage to the economy by
ultimate collapse of affected financial institution(s).

VI.

Micro Credit Regime

The micro credit regime of the CBN was designed to assist vulnerable groups and
persons with a view to empowering them financially so that they can contribute
to the development of the economy. If effectively implemented, the regime
would have tackled unemployment and acted as booster to productive
activities by the larger segment of the population. Unfortunately, like many of the
development policies of the Government the micro credit regime is yet to fully
achieve its objectives.
A Human Development Initiatives (HDI) Report20 observed that there are more
areas to be covered to address the micro finance methodologies in Nigeria,
Human Development Initiatives: The Philosophy and Loan Lending Practices of Selected Micro
Finance Banks/ Institutions in Lagos State and the Grameen Bank Model 2010 p.17
20
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when compared with what obtains in other jurisdictions. While the Nigerian
guidelines focuses more on profitability and quality of micro finance banks, those
in other jurisdictions focus on maximum outreach and poverty alleviation.
In an International Conference on Micro Financing organised by the First Bank of
Nigeria in 2011, the World renowned micro finance expert Mohammad Yunus
criticised Nigeria‘s micro finance regime as being tilted in favour of the rich at the
expense of the poor.21 Explaining the mechanism for the success of the Grameen
bank, Yunus said: ―What we did, was to look at conventional banking and do
things the opposite way. Conventional banking is for the rich so we decided it
should be for the poor. Conventional banking is for men; we set up Grameen
Bank for women. Conventional banking is set up in the city, whilst microfinance
bank is for the rural area. Conventional banks asks for collateral, we do not ask for
collateral‖22
The HDI report showed that microfinance in Nigeria seems to focus on how to
make money and not on how to assist the poor. With such a damning verdict
from an internationally renowned expert and a local survey report, it is not
surprising that micro financing in Nigeria has not achieved its avowed objective
of developing the economy.

VII.

The Global Crisis and the Nigerian Financial Sector

Initially there were conflicting opinions as to whether the Nigerian Financial
System was affected by the crisis that rocked the advanced western world 23. It
wasn‘t long, however, before it became clear to all that Nigeria was not spared.
The cause of the crisis in Nigeria was not hinged on the failure of regulation,
impact of corruption and poor corporate governance.
A joint CBN/ NDIC Audit investigation on the financial sector blamed the
depletion of capital on poor or non-observance of corporate governance
principles in the management of banks as well as outright fraudulent insider loans
taken by directors of banks to fund private businesses. Investors and depositors
Yunus, Nobel Laureate, faults Nigeria‘s microfinance banking: Business Day 6th September 2011
http://www.businessdayonline.com/NG/index.php/news/76-hot-topic/26923-yunusnobel-laureatefaults-nigerias-microfinance-banking visited 25/ 10/11
22 ibid
23 For instance the former Governor of Central Bank variously assured the nation that the economy
was not affected by the global crisis because of the enhanced capital base of the banks. See
Princess Iphie 50 years of Central Banking in Nigeria –Icons, Issues, Perspective. 2009 p 116
21
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were deceived by the operators with false reports of good performance
published annually but never challenged or sanctioned by the regulator. Reports
concealed huge non-performing loans to capital market operators and effect of
divestment by foreign investors afflicted by the global financial crisis.24
Several local investors lost life savings in the stocks of banks as the capital market
lost over 80 per cent of capitalization in one year. The attendant loss of
employment in both banks and capital market underscored the depth of the
crisis because the banking sector holding 65 per cent of the market capitalisation
was in deep crisis.25
The 2009 audit report revealed serious illiquidity and poor state of capital of five
(5) out of the eleven (11) banks that were initially audited. The other fourteen (14)
were later audited and their results released on October 16, and another four (4)
were found to be in the same dangerous state like the first 5. Eight (8) of the
distressed banks had their Management sacked and a total of N620 billion was
injected into the affected banks by the CBN to shore up their liquidity.
It is safe to say that the crisis in Nigeria has been escalated by a combination of
international and local factors. While the internationalisation of the capital
market exposed the sector to the vagaries of exogenous factors, local
peculiarities like high level corruption, lack of political will and more importantly
failure of corporate governance escalated the impact.
One cannot conclude that the crisis is over either globally or locally. According to
the G20 Declaration of 2008,‖…. regulation is first and foremost the responsibility
of national regulators who constitute the first line of defence against market
instability."26 This implies that although a crisis may arise out of factors external to
the economy, internal regulation remains the first line of defence. Indeed, we
note that countries like Canada whose local regulators were proactive in using
laws and policies as first line of defence were not burnt in the aftermath of the
crisis27.
Paul Ogbuokiri: Nigeria: Banking Sector – The Turmoil, The Crisis: http//allafrica.com/stories. Accessed
23/10/11
25 Ibid
26Declaration Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy
http://www.g20.org/Documents/g20_summit_declaration.pdf Accessed 31/10/11
27 ―Worldwide Financial Crisis Largely Bypasses Canada‖http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/10/15/AR20081
24
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The Central Bank of Nigeria, in pursuant to the CBN Act 2007 from 2008 to date,
has taken different measures to address the impact of the global financial crisis in
Nigeria. The Central Bank‘s intervention is hinged on four pillars namely: 28
1:
Enhancing the Quality of Banks
This consist of industry remedial programmes, risk based supervision, reforms to
regulation and regulatory framework, enhanced provisions for consumer
protection and internal transformation of the CBN. It is under this reform head that
bank chief executives were held accountable for their actions leading to the
sack of same and appointment of new management for the banks.
2:
Establishing Financial Stability
According to the Governor of the CBN ―The key features of this pillar centre
around strengthening the financial stability committee within the CBN,
establishment of a hybrid monetary policy and macro-prudential rules,
development of directional economic policy and counter-cyclical fiscal policies
by the government and further development of capital markets as alternative to
bank funding.‖
3:
Enabling Healthy Financial Sector Evolution
Reforms in this area include banking infrastructure, banking industry infrastructure
and role of the informal sector. The establishment of the Asset Management
Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON) and the new banking model come under this
reform head. Toxic shares of banks are assumed by the AMCON and would be
retained for two years before they are traded on the open market. AMCON is
billed to clear about US$10 billion by end-2012 at a cost of roughly US$5 billion.29
4:
Ensuring the Financial Sector contributes to the Real Economy
Policy measures in this regard include making more efficient the development
programmes of CBN such as the Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme (ACGS)
micro finance and the Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) financing schemes.

Sanusi Lamido ―The Nigerian Banking Industry: What Went Wrong and the Way Forward‖ Speech at
Bayero University Kano Convocation Lecture, Feb 26 2010:
http://www.cenbank.org/out/speeches/2010/the%20nigerian%20banking%20industry%20what%20we
nt%20wrong%20and%20the%20way%20forwar d_final_260210.pdf accessed 1/11/11
29 Nigerian Banking Bailout and the Anatomy of Toxic Debt: http//newafricanpress.com/2011/05/29
accessed 25/10/11
28
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Integrity and Financial Sector Stability

Integrity connotes ideals of fairness, honesty and fair play. An effective system of
corporate governance in banks and financial institutions will impose appropriate
standards of conduct on managers with effective control and monitoring
procedures on banks in order to maximize opportunities for legitimate profits
subject to the best interests of depositors and shareholders. Good corporate
governance regulates the relationships between banks‘ stakeholders, their Boards
and management. It prevents the abuse of power and self-serving conduct, as
well as imprudent and high risk behavior by bank managers, and resolves
conflicts of interests between managers and board members on the one hand
and shareholders and depositors on the other.
In Nigeria there are four codes of corporate governance being implemented by
the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), the CBN, the National Insurance
Commission (NAICOM) and the National Pension Commission (PENCOM). Central
to these codes are issues of honesty, fairness, accountability, transparency,
performance orientation and commitment to the organisation. The Codes
impose both standards of conduct for managers and appropriate procedures for
internal controls in order to maximise opportunities for legitimate profits subject to
the best interests of stakeholders
In order to enhance the integrity of the financial markets the G20 suggest that
there must be commitment to:
bolstering investor and consumers‘ protection;
avoidance of conflict of interest;
prevention of illegal market manipulation, fraudulent activities and abuse;
protection against illicit finance risks arising from non-cooperative
jurisdictions; and
promotion of information sharing.30







It should be stated that integrity in governance either economic or political is not
just the presence of rules and regulations, stipulating appropriate behaviour, but
a commitment by all concerned to abide and play by those rules. It requires
honest, transparent actions and not lip service. Its goal is to impact positively on
the entire system.
30
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Recent revelations in Nigeria‘s financial system indicated an abject lack of
integrity. It can only be said that reports of phenomenal growth regarding these
institutions were the result of unproductive activities and manipulation of books
and figures. Rating agencies form a part of the charade. In 2007, Fitch rated 7
Nigerian banks amongst 1000 banks in the world, yet in May 2008, JP Morgan
issued a report, which warned that the top seven banks, with a combined market
capital of over US$40 billion, might be overvalued by as much as 56 per cent31.
It has been noted that ―Substantial amounts of money claimed by these financial
institutions is unreal, with the manipulation of the financial records, irresponsible
shoring up of share prices, without any genuine link to the real performance of
the companies owning these shares.‖32 These are clear failures of integrity. Thus,
for the on-going reforms to yield results players must imbibe the principles of
transparency, accountability and integrity. There should also be efforts to
produce money from productive activities entailing applying labour and
resources to wealth creation rather than manipulating the system for quick profit.
Without integrity, bailout funds are likely to be a waste of scarce and valuable
public assets and resources. Questions are already being asked on how banks
are applying bailout funds. According to Kazeem:
―The bail-out funds handed out to the banks by this regime will never go
into anything productive, but rather prepare a catastrophic ground for
more disastrous economic woe. We are already witnessing where tax
payers money given to the banks is going. Bankers are now using these
funds for speculative purposes on foreign exchange.

IX.

Conclusion

The global financial crises/Nigerian crisis has raised queries as to the efficacy of
regulation and especially the efficiency of financial regulators. By section 13 of
the BOFIA, a bank shall maintain at all times, capital funds unimpaired by losses in
such ratio to all or any assets or to all liabilities or to both assets and liabilities as
would be stipulated by the CBN. This is required in preventing indefinite lending,
when at the threshold a bank cannot extend another loan without acquiring

Ola Kazeem: Nigeria Financial Crisis Any way out? http://www.marxist.com/ in defence of Marxism
accessed 31/ 10/11
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further capital on its balance sheet. If the CBN was alert to this provision, one
should ask how ailing banks acquired such huge debts on their balance sheets.
One should also ask what happened to reserve requirements provisions of
sections 15 and 16 of the BOFIA as well as Section 45 of the central bank Act.
Imposing reserve requirements has traditionally been used by Central Banks as a
means of monetary control and maintaining financial stability.
Another matter of concern is why several banks were exposed to the same
debtors despite the Central Bank‘s established Credit Risk Management System
(CRMS). Through this system CBN is to obtain returns from deposit money banks on
all credit of one million naira and above for compilation and dissemination to any
interested party. This enables deposit money banks to know the risk exposure of
their clients and helps them to avoid risky business.
The Nigerian society's penchant for responding to the influence of personalities as
opposed to the influence of institutions remains a threat to future financial
stability. As long as there remain personalities bigger than the system, either
notionally, practically or politically, the system will always be prone to instability
without exogenous factors and the integrity of the regulator will be called to
question. Furthermore, whatever reforms the CBN initiates to address the impact
of the global financial crisis must be anticipatory of changes in international
financial law in a way that does not result in frequent reversal of policy.
Current developments in the financial services sector have also led to questions
on how wide is the financial services sector bearing in mind that many ignorant
players assumed that a crisis in the capital market ought not impact banks in the
way that we have seen. The question has been who ought to have acted first
and how far and wide ought the action to have been?
These lapses may not be entirely the fault of the regulatory authority or that of
actors in the sector but a reflection of larger ideological and cultural realities in
Nigeria. As observed by Justin O‘Brien33 ―There is a dynamic interplay between
the culpability of individual actors and the cultural and ideological factors that,
not only tacitly condone, but also actively encourage, the elevation of short-term
considerations over longer-term interests‖
The Future of Financial Regulatio:Enhancing Integrity through Design Sydney Law Review vol. 32
2010 p65 http://sydney.edu.au/law/slr/slr_32/slr32_1/OBrien.pdf accessed 31/ 10/ 11
33

178

Central Bank of Nigeria

Economic and Financial Review

December 2011

Following the financial sector crises of the 1990s around the world and the current
global crisis, international efforts have focused on the causes of the crises, their
solutions, and prevention of future crises. Attention has also increasingly turned to
the role of institutions in economic development, with recent research suggesting
that institutions may in fact be the most significant factor. Regulatory institutions
especially must be built on principles of transparency and accountability and
integrity firmly entrenched on the rule of law.
There is a need, therefore, in Nigeria to go beyond just stipulating rules of
behaviour or code of conduct, but to ―evaluate how these rules and principles
are interpreted within specific corporate, professional epistemic communities and
how these influence and are influenced by regulatory practice‖.
Transparency in information sharing is also critical. The G20 transparency principle
anticipates enhanced disclosure rules on complex financial products and
ensuring complete and accurate disclosure by firms of their financial conditions.
The Declaration34 requires the following:


―The key global accounting standards bodies should work intensively
toward the objective of creating a single high-quality global standard.



―Regulators, supervisors, and accounting standard setters, as appropriate,
should work with each other and the private sector on an on-going basis to
ensure consistent application and enforcement of high-quality accounting
standards.
―Financial institutions should provide enhanced risk disclosures in their
reporting and disclose all losses on an ongoing basis, consistent with
international best practice, as appropriate. Regulators should work to
ensure that a financial institution‘s financial statements include a complete,
accurate, and timely picture of the firm‘s activities (including off-balance
sheet activities) and are reported on a consistent and regular basis.‖



Implementing these standards with other reforms will greatly improve the desire
for good governance and transparency in the regulation of Nigeria‘s financial
services sector.
Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy :
http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/g20/summit-sommet/g20/declaration_111508.aspx?view=d
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